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VENUE IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS:
JOHNSON GAS FOULS THE AIR
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1897, Congress enacted a special venue' statute governing patent
infringement actions,2 with the express intent that the special patent
venue statute stand independent of the general federal venue statute.3
For nearly a century afterward, commentators4 and the courts warred
over whether the general federal venue statute5 supplemented the special
patent venue statute. 6 Throughout the war, the federal courts consistently adhered to the original legislative intent, holding the rule governing
venue in patent infringement actions in a class by itself, outside the scope
of the general venue legislation. 7
After the latest battle, however, those advocating supplementation
claim victory in the war. In VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance
Co. ,8the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 9 dramatically altered longstanding common and statutory law by eliminating the
1. Venue refers to the place where a lawsuit may be properly brought and decided. See
infra note 19 and accompanying text.
2. Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695.
3. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., 1A JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.344, at
4240-60 (1991); 15 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3823, at 218-23 (1986); Richard C. Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25
STAN. L. REV. 551, 584-85 (1973). The commentators typically argued for the special patent
venue statute's revocation or revision, calling its original enactment a "historical accident."
Wydick, supra, at 585.
5. The general federal venue statute is now located at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)-(c) (1988).
6. The special patent venue statute is now located at 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988).
7. See, e.g., Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 713 (1972); Fourco
Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228 (1957); Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin
Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942). See infra notes 38-70 and accompanying text for a
discussion of these cases.
8. 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 11 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
9. The Federal Circuit has been the final arbiter in actions under the patent laws since
1982. See ARTHUR H. SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 2-3 (1984):
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was established on October 1,
1982, by merging the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is entrusted with significant new nationwide jurisdiction in the field of patents. In addition to hearing appeals from the
United States Patent and Trademark Office, all patent appeals from a United States
District Court are now centralized in this new court in an effort to attain uniformity
in patent law on an appellate level.
Id.
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patent venue statute's independence from the general venue statute. The
court held that the general corporate civil venue statute 10 defined the

residence of corporate defendants for purposes of venue in patent infringement cases.1 According to the court, patent holders may now sue

corporate patent infringement defendants in any judicial district in which
a normal corporate civil defendant may be sued. 2 The commentators
13
had argued for adoption of this exact result.

The Johnson Gas decision, however, should not be warmly welcomed by the legal community. The problem lies in the lack of authority

mandating the change. Although the Johnson Gas court appeared to
base its decision on a recent statutory revision, 14 a closer look reveals the
decision to be unsupported by congressional action or acquiescence.
Thus, by changing the law despite the existence of contrary congressional
authority, the Federal Circuit has crossed over the line marking the outer
limits of allowable judicial conduct.'I
This Note traces the birth and development of the general venue
statute, particularly the emergence of a general venue provision gov-

erning actions in which a corporation is a party. It also describes the
development of the special venue statute for patent infringement actions.

This Note then focuses on the major cases that have addressed how the
general venue statute and special patent venue statute should interact.
To answer the question whether the special patent venue statute should
be supplemented by the general venue provision governing corporations,
this Note analyzes the Federal Circuit's decision in Johnson Gas and exposes the court's flawed reasoning. This Note ultimately recommends
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988). The relevant portion of § 1391(c) provides that "[flor
purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to
reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action
is commenced." Id. The chapter referred to is chapter 87, title 28 of the United States Code,
which spans §§ 1391-1412. Section 1400(b), the patent venue statute, is included in chapter
87.
11. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1575. Section 1400(b) reads as follows: "Any civil action for
patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or
where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established
place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988) (emphasis added). The court held that the
definition of corporate residence supplied by § 1391(c) must be applied to determine where a
corporation "resides" for purposes of § 1400(b). Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1575.
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(c) (1988) ("corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial
district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction").
13. See supra note 4.
14. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1578; see Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013, 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)).
15. See infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.

April 1992]

JOHNSON GAS FOULS THE AIR

1109

that Johnson Gas be overruled. Any change in the meaning of the patent
venue statute must be effected by future congressional legislation.
II. BACKGROUND

Federal courts have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over actions arising under the patent laws.' 6 Plaintiffs seeking to assert a claim

of patent infringement must overcome two additional hurdles before they
may bring their claim in federal court: (1) the court must have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant;17 and, (2) venue must be proper in that
court. 8 Venue refers to the locality of a lawsuit-the place where judicial authority may be exercised. 9 In federal practice, each federal judicial district defines the smallest "place" where venue could be proper.20
Venue requirements are intended to lend a degree of certainty to the fo-

rum selection process and prevent unnecessary inconvenience to the parties.2 In criminal actions, the Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants
venue "in the district wherein the crime shall have been committed." 2 2
In civil actions, however, there is no constitutional right to a particular
venue. Thus, civil venue statutes have been a part of American jurisprudence since the beginning of the American judiciary.2 3
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). Section 1338(a) provides that "[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents ....Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent.., cases."
Id.
17. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 314-16 (1945).
18. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979).
19. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939); see also Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Eco Chem, Inc., 757 F.2d 1256, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (venue refers to place
where action may be properly instituted and decided). Jurisdiction, on the other hand, refers
to the source of authority of the court. Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 167-68; see also Leroy, 443 U.S. at
180 (stating that question of jurisdiction "goes to the court's power").
The determination of venue is relevant only if personal jurisdiction over the defendant has
been established, although in rare instances a court may resolve venue issues prior to engaging
in the personal jurisdiction issue. See, &g., Leroy, 443 U.S. at 181 (venue determined first to
avoid undecided question of constitutional law pertaining to personal jurisdiction).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988).
21. Leroy, 443 U.S. at 180. Specifically, venue statutes are designed to protect defendants
from litigating in inconvenient forums. Id. at 184. Venue is the personal privilege of the
defendant, rather than an absolute stricture on the court. Id. at 180. Thus, an objection to
improper venue may be waived by a defendant. Id. Subject-matter jurisdiction, on the other
hand, is a power granted by constitution or statute which no party has the authority to confer
or waive. Id.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
23. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
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Statutory History
1. General venue

The Judiciary Act of 1789,24 which created the federal judiciary,
also contained the nation's first venue provisions.2" Civil suits could be
initiated in the district in which the defendant was an inhabitant or in the
district in which the defendant was "found" at the time of serving the
writ.2 6 This was an extremely broad venue provision, allowing plaintiffs
to bring suits in districts in which the defendant was only transitorily
present.
This original venue rule remained in force until Congress adopted a
more restrictive rule in 1887.2
The 1887 revision eliminated the
"found" clause. Thus, most civil suits could now only
be instituted in
28
the district in which the defendant was an inhabitant.
2.

Special venue provisions for patent cases

Upon restriction of the general venue provisions in 1887, questions
arose concerning the venue rules applicable to patent infringement suits.
Prior to 1887, the broad venue rules of the 1789 Act were uniformly
applied to all actions, including those for patent infringement. 29 After
enactment of the restrictive general venue provisions of the 1887 Act,3"
however, dicta in two Supreme Court decisions implied that the new general venue rules of the 1887 Act did not apply in patent cases, and that
the extremely broad venue rules from the 1789 Act still applied in patent
infringement actions.3 1 Despite this guidance from the Supreme Court,
24. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. The lower federal courts are established, and the rules "necessary and proper" to govern them, are promulgated by Congress

pursuant to constitutional authorization. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 9, 18; id., art. III, § 2.
25. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. at 79.
26. Id. The second clause of this rule came to be known as the "found" clause. Neirbo
Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 172 (1939).
27. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552.
28. Not all civil suits had to be brought in the district in which the defendant was an
inhabitant, however, because the 1887 Congress also developed a separate rule governing
venue in cases in which subject-matter jurisdiction was based on the parties' diversity of citi-

zenship. Id. § 2, 24 Stat. at 553. In diversity jurisdiction cases, suit could be instituted in the
district of the defendant's residence or the district of the plaintiff's residence. Id. § 1, 24 Stat.
at 552-53.
29. Chaffee v. Hayward, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 208, 216 (1858).
30. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
31. In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1895); In re Hohorst, 150 U.S.
653, 661-62 (1893). The Court in Keasbey reasoned that the 1887 Act only regulated suits
which fell under the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state courts, while suits for
infringement of a patent right fell under the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction. Keasbey, 160
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lower federal courts split their decisions regarding proper application of
32
the 1887 Act.

In response to the confusion in the lower federal courts, Congress
enacted a separate patent venue law in 1897.33 Congress expressly intended the 1897 Act to eliminate the uncertainty generated by the growing number of conflicting decisions 34 regarding whether the 1789 or 1887
Act applied to determine venue inpatent infringement actions. 35 The
1897 Congress eliminated the confusion by enacting a completely new
venue rule. Plaintiffs could now bring patent infringement suits in the
judicial district where the defendant resided,3 6 or where the defendant
had committed acts of infringement and had a regular and established
place of business. 37 Compared to the 1789 Act, the 1897 Act explicitly
U.S. at 230-3 1. Therefore, the provisions of the 1887 Act did not affect patent infringement

suits. Id.
32. See Union Switch & Signal Co. v. Hall Signal Co., 65 F. 625, 627 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1895)

(limiting Hohorst to infringement suits against aliens or foreign corporations); accord Donnelly
v. United States Cordage Co., 66 F. 613, 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1895). Contra Smith v. Sargent
Mfg. Co., 67 F. 801, 801 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1895) (following Hohorst).
33. Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695.
34. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
35. Note especially the following excerpt from the congressional debates concerning the
Act of 1897:
[Mr. Mitchell:] Mr. Speaker, the necessity for this law grows out of the acts of 1887
and 1888 which amended the judiciary act. Conflicting decisions have even arisen in
the different districts in the same States as to the construction of these acts of 1887
and 1888, and there is great uncertainty throughout the country as to whether or not
the act of 1887 as amended by the act of 1888 applied to patent cases at all.
The bill is intended to remove this uncertainty and to define the exact jurisdiction of the circuit courts in these matters.
29 CONG. R.Ec. 1900 (1897) (remarks of Mr. Mitchell, who reported bill for House Committee
on Patents).
36. According to prevailing law at the time, a corporation "resided" only in the district in
which it was incorporated. See Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Gonzales, 151 U.S. 496, 504
(1894).
37. Act of Mar. 3, 1897, 29 Stat. at 695-96. Chapter 395 of the 1897 Act stated:
[Iln suits brought for the infringement of letters patent the circuit courts of the
United States shall have jurisdiction, in law or in equity, in the district of which the
defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the defendant, whether a person, partnership or corporation, shall have committed acts of infringement and have
a regular and established place of business. If such suit is brought in a district of
which the defendant is not an inhabitant, but in which such defendant has a regular
and established place of business, service of process, summons, or subpoena upon the
defendant may be made by service upon the agent or agents engaged in conducting
such business in the district in which suit is brought.
Id. The service of process portion of the original statute is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1694 (1988).
The first clause of chapter 395 of the 1897 Act has been held to be substantively the same as
the present patent venue statute located at 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). See Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1957).
Section 1400(b) currently reads: "Any civil action for patent infringement may be
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has com-
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restricted the allowable venue in actions to enforce patent rights.
B.

Common Law Developments

1. Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co.
Forty-five years after enactment of the special patent venue provision, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the interaction between the general venue provisions and the special patent venue statute. 38

In Stonite ProductsCo. v. Melvin Lloyd Co. ,39 the plaintiff sought to sup-

plement the patent venue statute4 with a section of the general venue

statute which provided that, for purposes of actions against multiple defendants who reside in different districts in the same state, venue was
proper in either district.4 1
Reasoning that the 1897 Act clearly intended to create a separate
patent venue statute independent from the general venue statute,42 the

Supreme Court declared that "Congress did not intend the Act of 1897
to dovetail with the general provisions relating to the venue of civil suits,
but rather that it alone should control venue in patent infringement proceedings."'4 3 No further controversy surrounded the patent statute until

1948. 44
2. Revision of the Judicial Code and Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra
Products Corp.
Before 1948, the general venue rule and patent venue rule applied
equally to individuals and corporate litigants. 4 To enable easy application of the residence-oriented venue statutes, the courts defined the resi-

dence of a corporation to be only the district in which it was
mitted acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b) (1988).
38. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
39. Id.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 109 (1940). Section 109 was the codified version of the patent venue rule
enacted as chapter 395 of the Act of March 3, 1897. Essentially this same provision is found
today at 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988).
41. Stonite, 315 U.S. at 561-62.
42. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
43. Stonite, 315 U.S. at 566.
44. Before 1948, both the general venue rules and the special patent venue rules were also
applied to corporate defendants. Suttle v. Reich Bros. Constr. Co., 333 U.S. 163, 166-68
(1948) (decided shortly before enactment of 1948 Judicial Code revision). Enactment in 1948
of the general venue rule applicable to corporations generated the controversy at issue in
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957), which is discussed in the
next section. See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the development of the general corporate venue statute, see infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
45. Suttle, 333 U.S. at 166-68.
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incorporated.4 6 In 1948, however, Congress enacted a separate general

venue rule for corporations 47 as part of a comprehensive revision of the
Judicial Code.48
The new corporate general venue provision, codified at § 1391(c) of

title 28 of the United States Code,4 9 provided that "[a] corporation may
be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to

do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of the corporation for venue purposes." 50
Although Congress apparently intended the 1948 codification to simply

compile the existing common law,51 commentators quickly read new
meaning into the corporate general venue code section, determining that

a corporation could now reside in more than just the judicial district of
its incorporation. 2
Following the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code,5 3 the federal
courts split their decisions on the question of whether the definition of
corporate residence in the new general venue rule54 also defined the resi46. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Gonzales, 151 U.S. 496, 504 (1894); see also Automotive
Equip. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 10 F. Supp. 736, 738-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) ("Where the state of
incorporation has more than one district, the habitation is in the district in the state where the
principal place of business is located.").
47. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 773, § 1, 62 Stat. 869, 935 (enacting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c)).
48. See generally William W. Barron, The Judicial Code-1948 Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439
(1948) (authored by Chief Reviser) (stating that Congress revised Judicial Code in response to
demand for single source of positive law governing judiciary).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1948).
50. Id.
51. In an article written shortly after the codification, the Chief Reviser took pains to point
out that substantive changes had been kept to a minimum throughout the whole codification
process. See Barron, supra note 48, at-441. Furthermore, the House Report on the revision
stated that only "minor changes were made in the provisions regulating the venue of district
courts in order to clarify ambiguities or to reconcile conflicts. These are reflected in the reviser's notes under sections 1391-1406." HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVISION OF
TrrLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947). Unfortunately, the reviser's note for § 1391(c) has never been fully understood, and is of no use in
determining Congress's intent. See Charles A. Wright, Forword[sici to LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE "JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE" at iii
(Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1971) ("The Reviser's Notes suggest that often
the Reviser was wholly unaware of the significance of what he was doing.").
52. See JAMES MOORE, MOORE'S JUDICIAL CODE COMMENTARY 1 0.03(28), at 178
(1949) (stating that corporation now could "be a resident of many districts for purposes of
applying the [general] venue rules, whereas formerly a corporation was resident of only one
district").
53. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1948).
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dence of corporations for purposes of the patent venue provision. 5 In
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp. ,6 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the interaction between the general venue pro-

visions and the special
patent venue statute previously explored by the
57
Court in Stonite.

In Fourco, the plaintiff argued that the new, broader definition of
corporate residence in the general venue statute should supplement the
patent venue statute.5 8 Plaintiff asserted that the definition of corporate
residence provided in § 1391(c) should be used to determine where a corporate defendant resided for purposes of § 1400(b).59
The Court rejected plaintiff's contention, stating that the issue was
"not legally distinguishable" from the issue decided in Stonite. ° The
Court reaffirmed the holding of Stonite that the patent venue statute was
not to be supplemented by the general venue provision.6 1 The Court also

rejected any suggestion that the 1948 Act effected a change in the patent
venue provision.6 2 The Court therefore concluded that the creation of
§ 1391(c) could not change the definition of corporate residence for purposes of venue in patent infringement actions.6 3
In a line of cases following Fourco, the federal courts consistently
held that "28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision con-

trolling venue in patent infringement actions," and4 that it is not to be
supplemented by general venue statute provisions.r

55. Id. § 1400(b) (1948). As part of the 1948 revision to the Judicial Code, the revisers
moved the patent venue provisions previously located at § 109 into § 1400(b).
56. 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
57. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
58. Fourco, 353 U.S. at 223.
59. Id. at 223-24.
60. Id. at 224.
61. Id. at 228.
62. "[W]e hold that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) made no substantive changes from 28 U.S.C.
(1940 ed.) § 109 as it stood and was dealt with in the Stonite case." Id.
63. Id. at 227-28.
64. Id. at 229; accord Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 713 (1972)
(stating that patent infringement cases are "in a class by themselves, outside the scope of general venue legislation"); Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 263 (1961) (stating that "for us to enlarge upon the mandate of the Congress as to venue in such patent actions
would be an intrusion into the legislative field"); see also American Cyanamid Co. v. Nopco
Chem. Co., 388 F.2d 818 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968) (declining to follow
supplementation argument).
In American Cyanamid, the plaintiff argued that the patent venue statute should be supplemented by the 1966 amendment to § 1391(b) which allowed federal question cases to be
brought in the district "in which the claim arose." Id. at 820-21 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)
(1966)). The Fourth Circuit found the argument "interesting and not without merit," but held
that Stonite, Fourco and Schnell foreclosed consideration of such a theory. Id. at 821.
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Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum Industries

In 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided another challenge to the independence of the special patent venue statute. In Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum Industries,6" the plaintiff attempted to
supplement the special patent venue statute with the alien venue statute
codified at § 1391(d) of title 28,66 which allows an alien to be sued in any
district.
The Court first determined that § 1391(d) was not a general venue
statute: "[lit totally misconceives the origin and purpose of § 1391(d) to
characterize that statute as an appendage to the general venue statutes,
analogous to the provisions at issue in Stonite and Fourco."6 7 Reasoning
from this premise, the Court concluded that "in § 1391(d) Congress was
stating a principle of broad and overriding application, and not merely
making an adjustment in the general venue statutes, as this Court found
Congress had done in Stonite and Fourco."'6 The Court determined the
alien statute to be the declaration of a rule which could not be confined in
its application like the general venue statute6 9 Therefore, § 1391(d) was
70
held to supplement § 1400(b).
The Brunette Court carefully distinguished § 1391(d) from the general venue statute in order to circumvent § 1400(b)'s immunity from the
general venue statute and allow § 1391(d) to supplement § 1400(b).
III.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

In 1988, Congress amended § 1391(c) of title 28, the general venue
statute governing corporations, as part of the Judicial Improvement and
Access to Justice Act. 71 As amended, § 1391(c) now provides that "[flor
purposes of venue under this chapter ' 72 a corporation is deemed to reside
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

406 U.S. 706 (1972).
28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1988).
Brunette, 406 U.S. at 713.
Id. at 714.
Id.
Id.

71. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988). The final version of the bill passed.the
Senate on October 14, 1988 and the House on October 19, 1988. Id. at 4673. The President
signed the bill on November 19, 1988 and amendments contained in the bill became effective
on February 17, 1989. Id.; see also David D. Siegel, Changesin FederalJurisdictionand Practice Under the New Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 123 F.R.D. 399, 399
(1989) (discussing passage of bill). In addition to amending § 1391(c), the Act made a significant number of changes to federal court procedure. For example, the Act raised the amount in
controversy required in diversity jurisdiction cases to $50,000, changed the definition of citizenship under certain circumstances, and altered removal procedure. Id. at 402-09.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988). As amended, the full text of § 1391(c) states:
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in any district in which the corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction.73 Some evidence exists of the legislature's intent with respect to the
1988 revision of § 1391(c). 74 However, as far as can be discerned, there
is no legislative history regarding the revision's effect on § 1400(b). For

the most part, Congress revised § 1391(c) to change the manner in which
general corporate venue was determined in states with multiple judicial
districts.7 5 The prime intent of these changes was to curtail the available

districts in which a corporation could be sued when a state is divided into
For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be
deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction
at the time the action is commenced. In a State which has more than one judicial
district and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to reside
in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it
to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there is no such
district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has
the most significant contacts.
Id. The chapter referred to in the first line of the revised statute is chapter 87, title 28 of the
United States Code, which spans §§ 1391-1412.
Section 1400(b), the patent venue statute, is included in chapter 87, and states: "Any civil
action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant
resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988).
73. Id. § 1391(c).
74. See, eg., H.R. REX'. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-81 (1988), reprintedin 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982-6042; Judicial Branch Improvements Act of 1987 Hearings on S. 1482
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practiceof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 90-91 (1988); Court Reform andAccess to JusticeAct, 1988: Hearingson
H.R. 3152 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 656 (1987-1988); see also infra
notes 147-59 and accompanying text (discussing pre-amendment memos to Judicial Conference Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction).
75. The best summation of the amendment's purpose appears in the House Report:
Venue generally turns on one of two considerations: the place where the claim
arose or the residence of the parties. When one or more of the parties is a corporation, venue problems arise in determining a corporation's "residence." The general
venue statute defines the residence of a corporation as "any judicial district in which
it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c). Read literally, the statute appears to make venue proper in any district in
a multidistrict state in which a corporation is incorporated, licensed to do business,
or doing business.
The Committee concluded that a corporation for venue purposes should be
deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it was subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action was commenced. In multidistrict states in which a corporation is not incorporated or licensed to do business, the venue determination should
be made with reference to the particular district in which a corporation is sued.
Thus, for example, a corporation that confines its activities to Los Angeles (Central
California), should not be required to defend in San Francisco (Northern California)
unless, of course, venue lies there for other reasons. This amendment would accomplish this purpose.
H.R. REP. No. 889, supra note 74, at 70, reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6031.
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several judicial districts.7 6 The legislative intent leads logically to the
conclusion that Congress merely intended to clarify general corporate
venue in states with multiple judicial districts.

Almost immediately following the passage of the 1988 Act, how-

8
ever, a dispute over the same issue litigated in the Stonite 77 and Fourco7
cases arose: whether the patent venue rule should be supplemented by
the provisions of a general venue statute,7 9 and more particularly
whether the new definition of "residence" in § 1391(c) should apply to
define the word "resides" in § 1400(b). This dispute arose from the addition of the new phrase "[flor purposes of venue under this chapter" in the
opening sentence of the amended § 1391(c).8 0 The chapter referred to is
chapter 87, which includes § 1400(b). 1 Shortly after the amendment to

§ 139 1(c), the lower federal courts split their decisions regarding whether
this new language required the corporate venue statute to supplement the
special patent venue statute.8 2
Over the years a vocal group has consistently called for supplementation of the special venue statute with the general venue statutes.8 3 Af-

ter any significant revision to the venue statutes, these "supplementers"
challenge the patent venue statute's independence.8 4 Each battle generates strong and vigorous debate, even though those opposing supplementation have consistently won in the courts."5 Consistent with past
76. See Siegel, supra note 71, at 406.
77. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
78. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
79. See supra notes 38-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Stonite and
Fourco decisions.
80. See supra note 72 for the full text of § 1391(c).
81. Chapter 87 spans §§ 1391-1412 of title 28.
82. Prior to the October 24, 1990 decision in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance
Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991), seven district courts
addressed the problem. Three decided that the revised § 1391(c) did not supplement
§ 1400(b). See Tri-Tronics Co. v. MacGregor & Co., No. 90 C 0630, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9141 (N.D. IM.July 25, 1990); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Amerace Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. Ill.
1990); Doelcher Prods. v. Hydrofoil Int'l, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 666 (D. Md. 1989).
Four courts decided that the revised § 1391(c) did supplement § 1400(b). See Ernster v.
Ralston Purina Co., 740 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mo. 1990); Diamond-Chase Co. v. Stretch Devices, Inc., No. CV 90-1808 (C.D. Cal. filed May 29, 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 923 F.2d
871 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 734 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Cal.
1990); Century Wrecker Corp. v. Vulcan Equip. Co., 733 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Tenn. 1989),
aff'd mema, 923 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1587 (1991).
83. See, e.g., IA MOORE et al., supra note 4, 1 0.344, at 4248-49; 15 WRIGHT et al., supra
note 4, § 3823, at 218-19; Wydick, supra note 4, at 584.
84. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1957) (challenge following 1948 codification); Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 567
(1942) (challenge following 1897 Act).
85. See, ag., Fourco, 353 U.S. at 228-29; Stonite, 315 U.S. at 567.
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history, the supplementers seized the 1988 revision to § 1391(c) as another opportunity to challenge the independent status of the special pat-

ent venue statute. After the divided results at the district court level,8 6 a
1990 Federal Circuit opinion decided the merits of this latest challenge.8 7
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE-VE HOLDING CORP. v JOHNSON
GAS APPLIANCE CO.

A.

The Facts

VE Holding Corporation (YE), owner of three United States patents, filed two suits in the Northern District of California against John88
son Gas Appliance Company alleging infringement of VE's patents.
Johnson moved to dismiss for improper venue in both cases, asserting
that it was an Iowa corporation with no regular and established place of
business in the Northern District of California.89
The district court agreed, finding that Johnson, as an Iowa corporation, did not "reside" in the Northern District of California under the
definition of corporate residence used in § 1400(b). 90 The court rejected
VE's argument that the 1988 revision 91 of the general corporate venue
statute9 2 redefined the term "resides" as it is used with respect to corporations in § 1400(b). 93 Therefore, the district court held that venue was
not proper in the Northern District of California with respect to Johnson. 94 VE appealed to the Federal Circuit. 95
86. See supra note 82.
87. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
88. Id. at 1576. The opinion of the court did not describe the allegedly infringed patents.
89. Id. at 1577. The second clause of the special patent venue statute allows suit to be
brought where defendant has "committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988). This Note is primarily concerned with
the first clause of § 1400(b) and is not concerned with the interpretation and application of the
second clause. A significant body of law already exists on that subject.
90. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1576. The district court relied on the common law rule that,
for venue purposes, a corporate patent infringement defendant resided only, in the district of its
incorporation for venue purposes. Id.
91. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat.
4642, 4669 (1988).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988).
93. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1576.
94. Id.
95. Id. The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the nation's district courts on matters involving patents. See SEIDEL, supra note 9, at 2.
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Reasoning of the Federal Circuit Court
1. Fourco is distinguishable

The Federal Circuit began the substantive portion of its opinion by
stating that the previous Supreme Court cases finding an immunity in
§ 1400(b) from § 1391(c) were no longer applicable due to the change in

§ 1391(c)'s language.96 The court recognized that "it is sometimes said
that, since Fourco, the only way to change the way that venue in patent
infringement actions is determined is to change § 1400(b)."9 7 The court
asserted that this argument failed for two reasons.
The court first noted that the Supreme Court has refused to act to
impede Congress's ability to enact or amend legislation. The court cited
Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum Industries, Inc. 91 to support their

position that Congress could supplement or amend § 1400(b) through
enactment of another statute. The court then stated that Fourco did not
apply because the language of § 1391(c) "as it was in Fourco is no
longer." 99

2. Plain meaning rule
The court in Johnson Gas then applied the plain meaning rule,"°
which states that "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself ... [T]hat language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." _The Supreme Court, however, has carved out a
narrow exception to this rule: in "rare occasions under highly unusual
circumstances" 1 °2 a court may conclude that the words used by Congress
did not capture the congressional intent. The plain meaning rule analysis
is susceptible to this narrow exception when a clear-cut contrary legislative intent exists103 or "a literal application of the statute produces a result so unlikely that Congress could not have intended it.'' 1°"
96. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1579.
97. Id.
98. 406 U.S. 706 (1972). See supra notes 65-70 for a discussion of Brunette.
99. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1579.
100. A long line of United States Supreme Court decisions support the plain meaning rule.
See, e.g., Burlington Northern R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987);
United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
101. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. at 108.
102. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1579.
103. Id. (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590 (1981)); see also Garcia v.
United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) (stating that existence of contrary legislative intent justifies limitation on plain meaning of statute).
104. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1579-80 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S.
235, 242-43 (1989)).
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The Johnson Gas court concluded that the plain meaning rule applied because "the language of the statute is clear and its meaning is
unambiguous." 105 The court then dismissed each of the exceptions. The
court found the first exception inapplicable because Congress had not
clearly expressed that its intent was contrary to the court's interpretation
of the words of the statute.1" 6 The court found the second exception
inapplicable because the broadening of available venue in patent infringement actions was not a result that "Congress could not have
10 7
intended."
3.

Rule against implicit repeals

The court in Johnson Gas also addressed the general statutory construction rule against implicit repeals. The rule against implicit repeals
provides that a general statute ordinarily shall neither control nor nullify
a specific statute.10 8 The common law, however, has recognized an exception to this rule when the legislature manifests a clear intention to
repeal the specific statute.109
Initially, the court baldly stated that the rule against implicit repeals
"does not govern the present situation."1 10 The court supplied very little
support for this conclusion, merely stating that the general rule did not
apply because: (1) § 1391(c) "reads itself into the specific statute"; and,
11
(2) § 1391(c) "only operates to define a term in § 1400(b)."'
Moreover, the court stated that if the rule applied to the instant
situation, the exception to the rule prevailed because the words of
§ 1391(c) evidenced Congress's clear intention to supplement

§ 1400(b).

112

4. Holding
Based on the above arguments, the court in Johnson Gas held that
13
the 1988 revision to the wording of the general corporate venue statute'
redefined the term "resides" as it is used with respect to corporations in
105. Id. at 1580.

106. Id.
107. Id. at 1583-84.
108. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974). A general statute which controls
or nullifies a specific statute is said to "implicitly repeal" the specific statute.
109. See Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); infra notes 179-96 and
accompanying text.
110. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1580.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988).
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§ 1400(b). 114 Using this new definition of the word "resides," the court
held that the defendant corporation resided in the Northern District of
California because the court had obtained personal jurisdiction over the
corporation in that district."' Thus, under § 1400(b), venue was proper
in the Northern District of California. 116 The court reversed the district
court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consis17
tent with its opinion.
V. ANALYSIS
A.

The ProperRole of Fourco After the Amendment to § 1391(c)

The court in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. 1 sbegan the substantive part of its opinion by attempting to distinguish
Fourco Glass Co. v. TransmirraProducts Corp." 9 and other judicial precedent associated with § 1400(b). In particular, the court took offense at
the argument that the only way to change the method of determining
venue in patent infringement actions was to amend § 1400(b). The Federal Circuit held that this argument failed for two reasons.
First, the court noted that the Supreme Court has refused to "impose such a disablement upon the Congress's ability to enact or amend
legislation."' 2 The court cited Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum Industries, Inc. 2 1 as an example of this policy. The court's reliance on
Brunette, however, is misplaced. The Brunette Court went to great
lengths to distinguish § 1391(d) from the general venue statute in order
to avoid abrogating the special patent venue statute's immunity from the
general venue statute. 122 The Brunette decision does not support the
Federal Circuit's position in Johnson Gas. Rather, Brunette recognized
114. Id. § 1400(b). The first part of § 1400(b) states that "[a]ny civil action for patent
infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides." Id. (emphasis added).
115. Section 1391(c) defines the residence of a corporation as "any judicial district in which
it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." Id. § 1391(c).
Johnson conceded that VE obtained personal jurisdiction over Johnson in the Northern District of California. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1584.
116. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1584.
117. Id. at 1575-76, 1584.
118. 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S.Ct. 1315 (1991).
119. 353 U.S. 222 (1957). See supra notes 53-64 for a discussion of the Fourco decision.
120. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1579.
121. 406 U.S. 706 (1972). See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Brunette decision.
122. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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that the patent venue
statute enjoyed an absolute immunity from the gen123
eral venue statutes.
Second, the Johnson Gas court asserted that the defendant's Fourco
argument must fail because "[s]ection 1391(c) as it was in Fourco is no
longer."' 124 Thus, according to the court, Fourco did not apply and the
sole issue was what "Congress now intends by this new language in the
125
venue act."'
The court's technical factual dismissal of Fourco is unwarranted.
Like the plaintiff in Fourco, VE argued that the new, liberalized general
26
corporate venue statute should supplement the patent venue statute.'
Like the plaintiff in Fourco, VE asserted that the word "resides" in the
patent venue statute should be defined per the definition of corporate
residence given in § 139 1(c).' 27 Accordingly, just as the Fourco Court
upheld the independence of the patent venue statute because the Court
found the issue "not legally distinguishable from the issue decided in
Stonite,"'12 1 the Johnson Gas court should have upheld the independence
of the patent venue statute because the issue before the court was legally
identical to the issue already decided in Fourco and Stonite.
Notwithstanding a technical factual dismissal of the holding of
Fourco,129 the reasoning underlying the Fourco decision remains valid.
Fourco found that § 1400(b)'s immunity from the reach of the original
§ 1391(c) did not depend on the wording of § 1391(c). Moreover, Fourco
determined that 1400(b)'s immunity arose from the legislative history of
the original patent venue statute, 30 the forerunner to § 1400(b). 13l This
legislative history clearly shows that the 1897 Congress intended that the
32
patent venue statute stand independent from the general venue statute.
In particular, nothing in the historical record stated that the patent
venue statute's immunity depended on the wording of the general venue
123. "[MIn 1897, Congress placed patent infringement cases in a class by themselves, outside
the scope of general venue legislation." Brunette, 406 U.S. at 713.
124. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1579. At the time of the Fourco case, § 1391(c) contained
the phrase "for purposes of venue." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1948). At the time of the Johnson
Gas case, § 1391(c) started with the phrase "[flor purposes of venue under this chapter." Id.
(1988). The Johnson Gas court determined that this technical change in language rendered the
Fourco holding inapplicable to the dispute before it. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1579.
125. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1579.
126. Id. at 1576; Fourco, 353 U.S. at 222.
127. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1576; Fourco, 353 U.S. at 223-24.
128. Fourco, 353 U.S. at 224.
129. See supra note 124.
130. Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695.
131. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text for a history of the patent venue statute.
132. See supra notes 33-37.
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statute. Thus, dismissal of the holding of Fourco does not limit the focus
of the instant dispute to only the plain meaning of the wording of
§ 1391(c). Instead, that plain meaning 133 must be supplemented by the
reasoning of Fourco, which mandates that § 1400(b) remain independent
from, and unaffected by, the wording of the general venue statute.
B. ProperApplication of the Plain Meaning Rule
1. Plain meaning of the amended section 1391(c)
After distinguishing the holding of Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra
Products Corp.," the court in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. 131 stated that the plain meaning rule 36 compelled the supplementation of § 1400(b) with § 1391(C).1 37 The court stated that the
"[fjor purposes of venue under this chapter" language of § 1391(c) was
clear and its meaning unambiguous, therefore § 1391(c) applied to all of
13
chapter 87 of title 28, including § 1400(b). 1
Such a conclusion, however, goes too far. Originally, § 1391(c) included the phrase "for purposes of venue,"' 139 and the revised § 1391(c)
contains the phrase "[flor purposes of venue under this chapter."'"'
The Supreme Court determined the reach of the original § 1391(c)
in Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez.14 1 After carefully distinguishing the Fourco
decision as "limited to the particular question of statutory construction
presented there,"1 42 the Suarez Court held that the general corporate
venue statute in chapter 87 of title 28 "applies to all venue statutes using
residence as a criterion, at least in the absence of contrary restrictive
indications in any such statute."' 14 3 The immediate result of the Suarez
decision was the supplementation of the specific venue provision of the
133.
134.
135.
136.

See infra notes 134-59 and accompanying text.
353 U.S. 222 (1957).
917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.

137. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1580.

138. Id.
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1948).
140. Id. (1988) (emphasis added).
141. 384 U.S. 202 (1966). Suarez involved an action under the Jones Act, which provides
seamen the right to recover damages for personal injuries incurred during the course of their
employment. The Jones Act contains its own specific venue provision which confers jurisdiction on the court "of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his
principal office is located." Id. at 203 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964)).
142. Id. at 206.
143. Id. at 205. The Court ruled that it would hold a general venue provision inapplicable
to a specific venue provision only if there was evidence that Congress intended the specific
venue provision to be exclusive or that Congress intended venue to be restrictively applied
under the specific venue provision at issue. Id. at 205-07.
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Jones Act with the general corporate venue statute.'

Lower federal
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courts subsequently relied on the broad language of Suarez to extend the
reach of the general corporate venue provision to other specific venue

statutes located outside of chapter 87 of title 28.141

Read in light of the Suarez decision, the plain meaning of the additional wording of amended § 139 1(c) 146 expressly restricts the reach of
§ 1391(c) to, at most, only the specific venue provisions located within
chapter 87. The amended wording of § 1391(c) therefore overrules the

Suarez Court's extension of § 1391(c) to venue provisions located outside
of chapter 87 of title 28.
2.

Legislative history

The scant legislative history of the 1988 revision to § 1391(c)' 47 con-

tains express support for the proposition that the "under this chapter"
language eliminates application of the general venue statute to specific
venue statutes located outside of chapter 87, such as those found in the
Jones Act 4 ' and the antitrust laws. 149 Pre-amendment memorandums

to the legislative subcommittee responsible for the 1988 revision to
§ 1391(c)' 50 contain the key evidence of the purpose of the "under this
chapter" language added to § 1391(c).

In 1985, Federal Judge William W. Schwarzer wrote a memo to the
Subcommittee which contained a proposed revision to § 139 1(c) and discussed the problems plaguing the statutory scheme governing general
144. The new rule applied particularly well to the Jones Act venue provision at issue in
Suarez. Congress enacted the Jones Act to provide broader venue rules at a time when the
general venue provisions applicable to Jones Act-type cases were more restrictive. Id. at 205.
Thus, the Court concluded that the Jones Act venue provision should be supplemented by the
general corporate venue statute. Id.
On the other hand, the history of the patent venue statute presents the completely opposite situation. Congress enacted the patent venue statute to provide more restrictive venue
rules at a time when the general venue provisions being applied in patent cases were much
broader. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. Moreover, Congress also intended
that the specific patent venue provision remain exclusive. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. Thus, the Suarez Court expressly noted that its new rule of venue statute interpretation would not affect the independence of the special patent venue statute. Suarez, 384 U.S.
at 206.
145. See, eg., School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers, 267 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (E.D. Pa.
1967) (extending § 1391(c) to 15 U.S.C. § 22).
146. The 1988 revision to § 1391(c) included the addition of the words "under this chapter." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988).
147. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
148. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988).
149. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22 (1988).
150. The Judicial Conference Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction (the "Subcommittee")
was responsible for generating, drafting and amending the proposed revision to § 1391(c).
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corporate venue. 151 The memo expressly stated that the revision primarily focused on the problem of determining corporate venue in a multi-

district state." 2 Judge Schwarzer subsequently admitted that the proposal he initiated "had a very narrow purpose and was not intended to
'15 3
overrule any special venue statute."
In 1986, at Judge Schwarzer's suggestion, Professor Edward H.
Cooper, the reporter for the Subcommittee, wrote a memorandum to the
154
Subcommittee which addressed the proposed changes to § 1391(c).
The revision reviewed by Professor Cooper already contained the "[flor

purposes of venue under this chapter" language identical to the wording
of the subsequently enacted provision.155 Professor Cooper's memo contained the reason for this restrictive language:

As a matter of caution, the proposal limits its definition of residence to the venue provisions gathered in chapter 87 of the Ju-

dicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 through 1412. If the proposal
were enacted in its present form, it would be necessary to re-

create definitions of residence for the specialized venue
156

statutes.
The specialized venue statutes referred to by Professor Cooper appear to

be those located outside chapter 87 of title 28, such as the Jones Act and
antitrust specialized venue provisions. 157 The fact that the plain words of

the revised statute included the proposal's limiting language 15 indicates
151. Memorandum from Judge William W. Schwarzer to the Subcommittee on Federal
Jurisdiction (Feb. 22, 1985), in 39 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 974, at 435-36
(Mar. 29, 1990) [hereinafter Schwarzer Memo].
152. See supra note 75 for a discussion of the amendment's purpose with respect to corporate venue in a multidistrict state.
153. CAFC Will Consider Whether New Law ChangedPatent Venue, 39 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 974, at 425-26 (Mar. 29, 1990) (quoting Judge Schwarzer).
154. Memorandum from Edward H. Cooper to the Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction
(Dec. 4, 1986), in 39 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 974, at 436-40 (Mar. 29,
1990) [hereinafter Cooper Memo]. Professor Cooper is a co-author of the 1986 federal civil
procedure treatise, CHARLES A. WRIGirr ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.
155. "As early as December 1985 the proposed redraft of § 1391(c) included the language
'[for purposes of venue under this chapter...."'" Century Wrecker Corp. v. Vulcan Equip.
Co., 733 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (E.D. Tenn. 1989), aff'd mem., 923 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1587 (1991) (quoting REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION TO THE COMM. ON COURT ADMIN., at 11 (Dec. 1985)). As of December 1986, the
proposal to amend § 1391(c) had been adopted by the Subcommittee, approved by the Committee on Court Administration, and remanded by the Judicial Conference. Cooper Memo,
supra note 154, at 435.
156. See Cooper Memo, supra note 154, at 438 (emphasis added).
157. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988) (special venue provision of Jones Act); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 15, 22 (1988) (special venue provisions of antitrust law).
158. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988).
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congressional assimilation of the intent to restrict application of the general venue statute to only those venue provisions contained in chapter
87. 159

3.

Proper application of the exceptions to the plain meaning rule

The conclusion that § 1391(c)'s wording plainly means that the statute now modifies only those venue statutes located within chapter 87
does not, however, lead to the conclusion that § 1391(c) now supplements § 1400(b). The result obtained under the plain meaning rule must
yield when a clear-cut contrary legislative intent exists or a literal application of the statute produces a result so unlikely that Congress could
not have intended it.16°
The second plain meaning rule exception is inapplicable to this case
because it is possible that Congress could have intended to supplement
§ 1400(b) with § 1391(c). The Johnson Gas court also held the first exception inapplicable because the legislative history of the 1988 revision to
§ 1391(c) fell silent with respect to the correct interaction of § 1391(c)
and § 1400(b). The court, however, failed to address the applicability of
the legislative history of the patent venue statute. The legislative history
of the precursor to § 1400(b)"' manifests Congress's original intent to
keep the patent venue statute free from the influence of the general venue
statute. Prior to enactment of the original patent venue statute, several
congressmen expressly stated that the statute should be regarded as independent from the general venue provisions.162 These statements provide the "clearly expressed legislative intention contrary to the literal
terms of the statute" necessary to constitute an exception to the plain
3
meaning rule.16
6
Fourco Glass Co. v. TransmirraProductsCorp. 64 and its progeny 1
recognized this history and held the patent venue statute immune from
the plain meaning reach of the general venue statute. Fourco and its
progeny were decided when § 1391(c) literally applied to all venue provi159. See Schwarzer Memo, supra note 151, at 438.
160. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
162. See 29 CONG. Rnc. 1900 (statements of Reps. Mitchell and Lacey).
163. Madison Galleries, Ltd. v. United States, 870 F.2d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Such
intent makes it clear that § 1400(b) is not to be supplemented simply through the action of the
plain wording of § 1391(c) even though § 1400(b) is located within chapter 87.
164. 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
165. See Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 713 (1972); Pure Oil Co.
v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 206 (1966); Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 263
(1961).
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sions, 6 6 therefore, the 1988 amendment's restriction of § 1391(c)'s reach
to only those venue provisions "under this chapter" should have absolutely no effect on the independently derived immunity of the patent
venue statute. 167 The plain meaning restriction of § 1391(c)'s scope of
application does not compel reversal of the preexisting, congressionallyintended and common law-enforced independence of the special patent
venue statute.
C. Proper Application of the Rule Against Implicit Repeals
The general rule against implicit repeals is a technical statutory construction argument that has been well developed in the case law. 168 Basic
principles of statutory construction dictate that "a specific statute will
not be controlled [n]or nullified by a general one, regardless of the prior169
ity of enactment."'
The court in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson GasAppliance Co. 17 held
that the general statutory construction rule against implicit repeals did
not govern the instant statutory dispute. 171 The court, however, only
1 72
devoted one short paragraph to an analysis of this argument.
The court stated that the general rule did not apply because
§ 1391(c) "reads itself into the specific statute"; 73 and, § 1391(c) "only
operates to define a term in § 1400(b)." 174 This argument fails to extricate the court from applying the rule against implicit repeals. Although
both of these statements are correct observations of § 1391(c)'s effect on
166. Fourco, 353 U.S. at 228.

167. No cases have been found that hold the newly revised § 1391(c) inapplicable to cases
brought under the specialized venue statutes located outside of chapter 87. This lack of authority may merely show widespread ignorance of the true effect of § 1391(c)'s amendment.
168. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974).
169. Id., quoted with approval in Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153

(1976). The Radzanower Court gave the reasons for the rule:
The reason and philosophy of the rule is, that when the mind of the legislator has
been turned to the details of a subject, and he has acted upon it, a subsequent statute
in general terms, or treating the subject in a general manner, and not expressly contradicting the original act, shall not be considered as intended to affect the more
particular or positive previous provisions, unless it is absolutely necessary to give the
latter act such a construction, in order that its words shall have any meaning at all.
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976) (emphasis added) (quoting THEODORE SEDGWICK, THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98 (2d ed. 1874)).

170. 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
171. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
172. The placement of this argument in the middle of the court's discussion of the plain
meaning rule may illustrate the court's discomfort with its own analysis of this argument.
173. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1580.
174. Id.
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§ 1400(b), they do not correctly state the full effect of § 1391(c) on

§ 1400(b).
The first clause of the patent venue statute allows a defendant to be
sued where he resides.1 75 The second clause of § 1400(b) allows a defendant to be sued where acts of alleged infringement have occurred, if
the corporation is also doing business in that locale.1 76 The Johnson Gas
decision expanded the first clause of § 1400(b) to allow a defendant corporation to be sued where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.1 77 Because a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction wherever it has
"minimum contacts" or is "doing business,"17 8 the court's interpretation
of § 1391(c) implicitly nullified the second clause of § 1400(b). Thus, the
Johnson Gas court should have applied the rule against implicit repeals.
The common law, however, has recognized an exception to the rule
when the legislature manifests a clear intention to repeal the specific statute. 17 9 Thus, the crucial issue here is whether Congress intended to work
an implicit repeal of § 1400(b) through the operation of the amended
§ 1391(c).1 8 The common law exception to the rule against implied repeals contains two well-settled categories of allowable repeals:
(1) [W]here provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an
implied repeal of the earlier one; and, (2) if the later act covers
the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier
act. 181

The Johnson Gas court's decision does not involve the second category of repeal by implication. In order for that exception to apply, the
second act must cover the whole subject of the earlier act. 82 Section
1391(c) does not cover the whole subject of § 1400(b) 1 8 3 Thus, for the
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988).
176. Id.
177. Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1584.
178. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 314-16 (1945).
179. See Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); infra note 109 and
accompanying text.
180. The Johnson Gas court said the express language of § 139 1(c) manifested such a clear
intention to "repeal" § 1400(b). Johnson Gas, 917 F.2d at 1580. The express language as a
"contrary intention otherwise" is merely a repeat of the plain meaning rule argument and will
not be discussed here further. See supra notes 134-63 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the effect of the express language of the revised § 1391(c) on the operation of § 1400(b).
181. Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503, quoied with approvalin Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,
426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976).
182. See Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503.
183. The 1988 revision to § 1391(c) clearly did not cover the whole subject of § 1400(b).
Section 139 1(c) applies only to venue with respect to corporations, see supra notes 45-52, while
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Federal Circuit's position to prevail, the legislature's intention to repeal
must be manifested through an "irreconcilable conflict" between the two
18 4

acts.

In 1976, the Supreme Court resolved a similar statutory dispute involving an alleged "irreconcilable conflict" between two acts. In
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.," the Court determined which venue
provision controlled: the broad venue provision of section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193416 or the narrow venue provision of section 94 of the National Bank Act of 1898.117 The Court stated that
irreconcilable conflict between two Acts means that "there is a positive
repugnancy between them or that they cannot mutually coexist." ' The
Court further emphasized that "repeal is to be regarded as implied only if
it is necessary to make the [later enacted law] work." 189 To begin its
analysis, the Court delved into the purposes of each Act. 190 After finding
that the basic purposes of the Securities Exchange Act can be fairly
served even while still giving full effect to the National Bank Act provision, the Court then concluded that because "it is possible for the statutes
to coexist in this manner, they are not so repugnant to each other as to
justify a finding of an implied repeal by this Court." 91
The same analysis used in Radzanower is applicable to the two
venue provisions at issue in Johnson Gas. According to the scant legislative history, the purpose of the 1988 amendment to § 1391(c) was to
eliminate the subjection of corporations to state-wide venue in multidistrict states.192 The purpose of the original patent venue statute was to
§ 1400(b) applies to venue with respect to corporations and individuals. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)
(1988).
184. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co. 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976).
185. 426 U.S. 148 (1976).
186. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
187. Rev. Stat. § 5198 (1898); 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1988).
188. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 155.
189. Id. (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
190. The Court found the purpose of the venue provision of the Securities and Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988), to be the facilitation of providing "fair and honest mechanisms
for the pricing of securities [and] to assure that dealing in securities is fair and without undue
preferences or advantages." Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 155. This was accomplished by allowing
suit wherever a defendant could be found. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
The Court found the purpose of the venue provision of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 94 (1988), to be the prevention of interruption in banking business that might result from a
bank's books being sent to distant counties. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 156. This was accomplished by only allowing suit in the district where the bank was established. See 12 U.S.C. § 94
(1988).
191. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 156-57.
192. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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restrict the venue available in patent infringement actions and clarify the
independence of such a venue rule from the general venue rules.193 Similar to section 94's effect on section 27 in Radzanower, § 1400(b) will have
no impact whatsoever on the vast majority of lawsuits against corporations.194 While suits brought against the defendants covered by
§ 1400(b) may have to be brought where the defendant is incorporated, 195 it simply is not necessary that § 1400(b) be repealed to make the
general corporate venue statute work. 19 6 For these reasons, it is impossi-

ble to conclude that § 1400(b) was implicitly repealed by passage of the
1988 Act.
D. FundamentalErrors of the Johnson Gas Court
The Johnson Gas decision also violated basic principles of our sys-

tem of government. With respect to statutory interpretation, the primary
responsibility of the federal judiciary is to subordinate its individual

wishes to the will of Congress, under the idea that the legislators' collective intention trumps the will of the court. 97
' Rather than performing
their proper role in this constitutional scheme, the Johnson Gas court
simply engaged in policy making, apparently to appease those dissatisfied
with the current state of the law. Such action is irreconcilable with the
judicial review approach intended for the judiciary by the framers of our

constitution. 198
Congress, not the judiciary, possesses enumerated powers to "pro-

mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,"' 19 9 "constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court,"'2 "° and "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow193. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
194. Patent infringement suits comprise a small minority of the general pool of litigation in
the United States courts. Those disputes that do make it into court are "notoriously costly,
complex, and technical." SEIDEL, supra note 9, at 123.
195. Venue may also be proper in a district where the defendant has its principal place of
business and has committed acts of infringement. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988).
196. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 157 (1976); Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
197. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 281
(1990). Another commentator stated that "[t]he conscientious judge searches for the 'true'
meaning of a statute, because the constitutional separation of powers assigns to the legislative
branch the central responsibility for the statutory management of social policy in the substantive areas allocated to it under the applicable constitution." Reed Dickerson, Dipping into
Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1125, 1125 (1983).
198. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
199. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
200. Id. cl.
9.
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ers." 2 1 Merely because a law has been dated by the passage of time and
fallen into disfavor with contemporary commentators does not mean that
a court now has the power, originally given to Congress, to unilaterally
change the law. It is Congress's function to set national policy.20 2 Activist judicial intervention should not give to litigants what Congress has
expressly chosen not to give to litigants.
The legislative history of the 1988 revision to § 1391(c)20 3 is silent
with respect to the proper interaction of § 1391(c) and § 1400(b). Such a
record does not expressly indicate or even imply congressional intent to
supplement the special patent venue statute with the general venue statute governing corporations. Under these circumstances, the independent
immunity of § 1400(b) from the general venue statutes, explicitly based
in the legislative history of the original patent venue statute and subsequently bolstered by years of judicial affirmation, may not be expressly
curtailed by the judiciary. Technical arguments of statutory construction cannot prevail against this immunity. As recognized by the
Supreme Court, the rules governing venue in patent infringement actions
may only be amended by express congressional revision of § 1400(b). 2 4
VI.

RECOMMENDATION:

JOHNSON GAS

MUST

BE OVERRULED

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in VE
Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.2 °5 must be overruled. The
court held that corporate patent infringement defendants may be sued in
an almost unlimited number of venues: any judicial district in which the
corporate defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.20 6 Venue requirements, however, are intended to reduce the cost and inconvenience to the
parties.2 "7 The Johnson Gas decision increased the cost and inconvenience of litigation for corporate patent infringement defendants. If allowed to stand, this decision could have a tremendous negative impact on
our society.
For example, because the decision greatly expanded a plaintiff's
venue choices, patent holders no longer have the cost of suing in a distant
forum to dissuade them from filing an action for patent infrigement.
Even a small increase in the number of patent infringement actions
201. Id. cl. 18.
202. See generally id. arts. I & III (delineating legislative authority to Congress and judicial
power to Supreme Court).
203. See supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text.
204. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1957).
205. 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
206. Id. at 1584.
207. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979).
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would severely disrupt the operation of the federal courts, due to the

notoriously
complex and time-consuming nature of patent infringement
8
actions.

20

An increase in the number of patent infringement suits creates other
troubling side effects. Companies competing with patent holders may
refuse to bring similar products to market for fear of subjecting themselves to expensive, time-consuming infringement suits in distant forums.
Concurrently, the costs of new products will increase as corporations set
aside funds to defend actions across the country. The reduction of viable
choices in the marketplace and the increased price of the available products will make consumers the ultimate loser.
On the other hand, a reversal of Johnson Gas returns the law to its
original, intended state.2 °9 Patent infringement suits would only be prosecuted where the corporate defendant is incorporated, or where the alleged infringement occurred-if the corporate defendant maintained a
regular and established place of business in that locale. As a result, patent infringement suits would continue to comprise a small minority of
the general pool of litigation in the federal courts.210 Furthermore, the
economics of competition would remain unaffected.
By enacting the special patent venue statute, Congress manifested a
policy determination that the two venues provided by the statute best
served the practicality and convenience concerns of patent infringement
defendants. The Johnson Gas court contradicted this congressional policy by misapplying the legal standards governing statutory construction.
Furthermore, if allowed to stand, the decision raises the specter of many
negative societal effects. Therefore, Johnson Gas must be overruled.
VII. CONCLUSION
The special patent venue statute has been held to possess an inherent
immunity from supplementation by the general venue statute for almost
100 years. For almost as many years, commentators and courts have
been locked in a bitter war over whether the general statute governing
venue in civil actions 11 supplements the special statute governing venue
in actions for patent infringement.212 The commentators have argued for
revocation or revision of this provision, or at least abrogation of its im208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See SEIDEL, supra note 9, at 123.
See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
See SEIDEL, supra note 9, at 123.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)-(c) (1988).
Id. § 1400(b).
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munity from the broader general venue statutes, on the grounds that the
narrow venue it allows is the result of historical accident.
The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the immunity of
§ 1400(b) from supplementation by the general venue statute.2 13 The
Court has repeatedly expressed the belief that the rules governing venue
in patent infringement actions are "in a class by themselves, outside the
' 2 14
scope of general venue legislation.
The 1988 revision to the Judicial Code2 15 spawned a dispute over
whether § 1400(b) should be supplemented by the provision of the general venue statute governing corporations, § 1391(c) of title 28 of the
United States Code. In VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that tenets of statutory
construction dictated that § 1400(b) be supplemented with the recently
revised § 1391(c).
The court's decision to supplement § 1400(b) with § 1391(c) contradicted the extensive congressional and judicial history of § 1400(b)'s immunity from the general venue statutes. The court misapplied the legal
standards concerning statutory construction to arrive at this erroneous
result. If allowed to stand, the decision could have many negative effects
on our society and economy. Thus, Johnson Gas must be overruled, and
an appeal to Congress made, in order to end this bitter war.
John A. Laco*

213. See Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 713 (1972); Schnell v.
Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 263 (1961); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods.
Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957).
214. Brunette Mach. Works, 406 U.S. at 713.
215. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642
(1988).
* Class of 1992, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Cal.; B.S.E.E., 1987, University of
Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind. Special thanks to my wife, Sheila Flynn Laco, for her unselfish love, support and encouragement.
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